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Abstract. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) provide valuable tools to monitor 
for, and militate against, the impact of cyber-attacks.   However, this paper 
identifies a range of theoretical and practical concerns when these systems are 
integrated into safety-critical systems. White-list approaches enumerate the pro-
cesses that can legitimately exploit system resources and any other access re-
quests are interpreted to indicate the presence of malware.  They cannot easily 
be used in safety-related applications where the use of legacy applications and 
Intellectual Property (IP) barriers associated with the extensive use of sub-
contracting can make it different to enumerate the resource requirements for all 
valid processes. In contrast, blacklist intrusion detection systems characterize 
the behavior of known malware.    In order to be effective, blacklist IDS must 
be updated at regular intervals.  This raises enormous concerns in safety-critical 
systems where extensive validation and verification requirements ensure that 
software updates must be rigorously tested.  In other words, there is a concern 
that an IDS signature update might itself introduce bugs into a safety-related 
system. Isolation between an IDS and a safety related application can minimize 
this threat, for instance, using information diodes.  However, further problems 
arise when IDS false positives compromise the reliability of safety-related ap-
plications. 
1 Introduction Intrusion	  detection	  systems	  (IDS)	  provide	  valuable	  tools	  for	  detecting	  potential	  cyber-­‐attacks.	  Aldenstein	  [1]	  stresses	  the	  need	  for	  protective	  monitoring	  over	  Supervisory	  Control	  and	  Data	  Acquisition	  (SCADA)	  sys-­‐tems	  –	  based	  on	  the	  capability	  of	  operating	  systems	  to	  monitor	  running	  processes	  and	  to	  examine	  the	  raw	  memory	  of	  a	  machine.	  	  	  Sutherland	  et	  al	  [2],	  have	  also	  explored	  the	  use	  of	  protective	  monitoring	  tools	  to	  identi-­‐
fy	  requirements	  for	  better	  access	  to	  information	  on	  memory,	  network	  and	  system	  activity	  to	  inform	  intrusion	  detection.	  	  	  Most	  previous	  work	  in	  this	  area	  has	  focused	  on	  intrusion	  detection	  for	  UNIX	  and	  Windows	  platforms.	  	  However,	  problems	  arise	  when	  control	  systems	  are	  hosted	  as	  applications	  on	  top	  of	  these	  mass-­‐market	  operat-­‐ing	  systems.	  	  Changes	  are	  often	  made	  by	  suppliers–	  for	  instance	  to	  cus-­‐tomise	  file	  handling.	  	  	  This	  can	  frustrate	  attempts	  to	  use	  existing	  IDS	  when	  operating	  system	  modifications	  undermine	  existing	  authentication	  and	  security	  mechanisms.	  	  	  For	  instance,	  role-­‐based	  file	  access	  mecha-­‐nisms	  are	  typically	  used	  to	  implement	  security	  policies.	  	  Lockout	  mecha-­‐nisms	  can	  then	  be	  used	  to	  ensure	  that	  unauthorized	  users	  cannot	  access	  a	  system	  while	  authorized	  users	  continue.	  	  However,	  many	  control	  systems	  use	  ad	  hoc	  or	  absolute	  permission	  techniques	  where	  system	  processes	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  distinguished	  to	  trace	  potential	  access	  violations	  –	  especially	  in	  legacy	  SCADA	  implementations.	  This	  paper	  identifies	  a	  range	  of	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  concerns	  when	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  are	  integrated	  into	  safety-­‐critical	  applica-­‐tions.	  Whitelist	  approaches	  enumerate	  the	  processes	  that	  can	  legitimately	  exploit	  system	  resources.	  	  These	  cause	  problems	  in	  most	  safety-­‐related	  applications	  because	  the	  costs	  of	  certification	  and	  development	  have	  led	  to	  a	  widespread	  reliance	  on	  sub-­‐contracting	  and	  on	  legacy	  applications.	  	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  difficult	  for	  companies	  to	  obtain	  precise	  details	  of	  the	  sys-­‐tems	  they	  operate	  when	  contractual	  and	  IP	  barriers	  frustrate	  the	  disclo-­‐sure	  of	  technical	  information	  that	  was	  not	  considered	  relevant	  during	  the	  acquisition	  process.	  	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  blacklist	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  rely	  on	  signatures	  that	  characterize	  the	  behaviour	  of	  known	  malware.	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  effective,	  these	  signatures	  must	  be	  updated	  at	  regular	  intervals.	  	  Otherwise,	  the	  IDS	  will	  not	  identify	  the	  latest	  generation	  of	  threat.	  	  	  However,	  this	  raises	  enormous	  concerns	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  systems	  where	  extensive	  validation	  and	  verification	  requirements	  ensure	  that	  software	  updates	  must	  be	  rig-­‐orously	  tested	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  will	  not	  compromise	  application	  pro-­‐cesses.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  an	  IDS	  signature	  update	  might	  introduce	  failure	  modes,	  including	  bugs,	  which	  would	  compromise	  
a	  safety-­‐related	  system.	  	  	  This	  threat	  can	  be	  minimized	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  isolation	  between	  a	  blacklist	  IDS	  and	  safety	  related	  systems	  using	  information	  diodes.	  	  	  Many	  regulators	  lack	  the	  technical	  insights	  necessary	  to	  approve	  such	  practices;	  in	  consequence	  very	  few	  IDS	  have	  been	  implemented	  within	  industrial	  control	  applications.	  Further	  problems	  stem	  from	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  conventional	  IDS	  only	  operate	  on	  conventional	  IP	  stacks	  rather	  than	  the	  lower	  level	  protocols	  used	  in	  many	  SCADA	  systems.	  	  More	  theo-­‐retical	  barriers	  include	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  IDS	  in	  safety-­‐related	  applica-­‐tions.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  miss	  positive	  instances	  of	  malware	  within	  a	  safety	  related	  application	  –	  however,	  if	  an	  IDS	  is	  too	  sensitive	  then	  it	  may	  trigger	  alarms	  even	  for	  nominal	  behaviour.	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  IDS	  can	  itself	  trigger	  a	  denial	  of	  service.	  	  The	  closing	  sections	  focus	  on	  the	  issues	  that	  arise	  after	  an	  IDS	  has	  correctly	  identified	  the	  presence	  of	  malware	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  systems.	  	  	  A	  host	  of	  concerns	  remain	  over	  our	  ability	  to	  reach	  a	  safe	  state	  following	  an	  attack,	  these	  are	  mirrored	  by	  uncertainty	  over	  appropriate	  forensic	  activities	  when	  –	  for	  example,	  preserving	  safety	  may	  overwrite	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  diagnose	  the	  causes	  of	  any	  in-­‐cident.	  
2 Manual Approaches to Intrusion Detection National	   and	   international	   organisations	   warn	   against	   an	   increasing	  threat	  from	  malware	  to	  safety-­‐critical	  systems	  [3,	  4].	  	  	  However,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  quantify	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  threat	  –	  given	  concerns	  over	  the	  disclosure	  of	   information	   about	   previous	   attacks.	   There	   are	   further	   technical	   and	  organisational	  barriers	   that	   frustrate	   attempts	   to	  detect	  potential	   intru-­‐sions.	   	   	  Malware	   is	  often	   identified	  as	  part	  of	   the	  normal	   fault	  detection	  processes	  that	  support	  the	  operation	  of	  complex	  infrastructures	  [5].	  	  	  Sys-­‐tem	   logs	   and	   network-­‐monitoring	   tools	   provide	   the	   evidence	   necessary	  to	   identify	   an	   intrusion	   [6].	   	   	  However,	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   combine	   to	  undermine	  cyber-­‐Situation	  Awareness	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  systems:	  
• Legacy	  systems.	  	  	  Many	  safety-­‐related	  applications	  combine	  layers	  of	  software	  that	  were	  gradually	  developed	  over	  many	  years.	  	  	  This	  com-­‐plicates	  the	  manual	  detection	  of	  malware	  given	  that	  legacy	  systems	  
were	  seldom	  designed	  with	  cyber-­‐security	  as	  a	  primary	  concern.	  	  	  Fur-­‐ther	  problems	  arise	  because	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  for	  engineers	  to	  distin-­‐guish	  normal	  behaviour	  from	  the	  symptoms	  of	  an	  attack	  when	  there	  is	  a	  limited	  understanding	  of	  the	  proprietary	  code	  that	  was	  written	  many	  decades	  before	  and	  often	  from	  companies	  that	  are	  no	  longer	  in	  busi-­‐ness.	  	  There	  have	  also	  been	  cases	  where	  legacy	  systems	  contract	  legacy	  viruses	  –	  for	  instance	  through	  the	  use	  of	  obsolete	  but	  infected	  floppy	  drives,	  forcing	  engineers	  to	  reconstruct	  diagnosis	  techniques	  for	  legacy	  applications.	  
	  
• IPR	  concerns	  and	  out	  sourcing.	  	  The	  manual	  detection	  of	  malware	  is	  complicated	  because	  many	  safety-­‐critical	  industries	  now	  make	  exten-­‐sive	  use	  of	  out-­‐sourcing.	  	  	  This	  can	  include	  the	  provision	  of	  network	  services.	  	  	  Unfortunately,	  outsourcing	  a	  service	  does	  not	  outsource	  the	  risk	  to	  safety-­‐related	  companies.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  it	  can	  create	  vulnerabili-­‐ties	  when	  malware	  propagates	  from	  sub-­‐contractors	  that	  lack	  the	  se-­‐curity	  culture	  of	  the	  companies	  that	  employ	  them.	  	  Out-­‐sourcing	  com-­‐plicates	  the	  manual	  detection	  of	  malware	  using	  standard	  debugging	  techniques	  because	  the	  safety-­‐critical	  organisation	  may	  identify	  the	  symptoms	  of	  an	  attack	  without	  the	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  the	  sub-­‐contractors	  code	  that	  would	  be	  required	  to	  diagnose	  the	  cause	  or	  to	  unambiguously	  identify	  those	  symptoms	  as	  the	  result	  of	  an	  intrusion.	  	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  end	  users	  who	  experience	  the	  safe-­‐ty-­‐related	  consequences	  of	  a	  security	  breach	  to	  trace	  the	  technical	  causes	  of	  particular	  violations.	  	  	  	  
• Failure	  of	  incident	  reporting.	  	  There	  are	  many	  barriers	  to	  the	  reporting	  of	  security	  violations	  up	  the	  supply	  chain.	  	  Contracting	  companies	  have	  significant	  concerns	  about	  the	  legal	  and	  commercial	  implications	  of	  admitting	  cyber	  incidents	  on	  their	  future	  business.	  	  	  Other	  industries	  have	  responded	  by	  creating	  legal	  requirements	  to	  share	  information	  about	  cyber-­‐attacks.	  	  	  Article	  13a	  of	  the	  Telecoms	  Directive	  (2009/140/EC)	  requires	  network	  service	  providers	  to	  report	  signifi-­‐cant	  security	  breaches	  and	  losses	  of	  integrity	  to	  competent	  national	  au-­‐thorities.	  	  	  The	  United	  States	  Security	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  also	  expects	  its	  members	  to	  file	  information	  about	  cyber	  incidents.	  	  It	  is	  for	  
this	  reason	  that	  the	  proposed	  EC	  Network	  and	  Information	  Security	  Di-­‐rective	  (COM2013/48)	  extends	  the	  Article	  13a	  reporting	  obligations	  across	  all	  European	  critical	  infrastructure	  providers.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  requirements,	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  for	  safety-­‐critical	  service	  provid-­‐ers	  to	  use	  information	  about	  previous	  incidents	  to	  guide	  the	  detection	  of	  future	  attacks.	  	  
• Lack	  of	  competency.	  	  	  Few	  safety-­‐critical	  organisations	  have	  the	  tech-­‐nical	  capacity	  to	  diagnose	  and	  combat	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  attacks	  on	  their	  own	  infrastructures.	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  US	  government	  has	  established	  their	  Industrial	  Control	  System	  Computer	  Emergency	  Re-­‐sponse	  Team	  (ICS-­‐CERT,	  https://ics-­‐cert.us-­‐cert.gov).	  	  They	  have	  the	  specialist	  expertise	  that	  is	  required	  to	  identify	  malware	  without	  un-­‐dermining	  the	  safety	  of	  complex	  application	  processes.	  	  Many	  Europe-­‐an	  industries	  lack	  this	  support	  and	  instead	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  external	  se-­‐curity	  service	  providers	  who	  have	  little	  understanding	  of	  the	  critical	  nature	  of	  the	  underlying	  software	  architectures.	  	  
• Lack	  of	  appropriate	  guidance.	  	  Both	  ENISA	  [3]	  and	  NIST	  [8]	  provide	  valuable	  guidance	  on	  how	  to	  improve	  the	  detection	  and	  reporting	  of	  potential	  incidents,	  neither	  considers	  the	  role	  of	  sub-­‐contractors	  in	  gathering	  evidence	  about	  cyber	  attacks.	  	  	  Neither	  considers	  the	  com-­‐plexities	  that	  can	  arise	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  applications,	  for	  example	  when	  malware	  is	  potentially	  detected	  in	  software	  that	  has	  gone	  through	  a	  formal	  certification	  process.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  omission;	  lives	  may	  depend	  on	  the	  timely	  provision	  of	  information	  about	  the	  scope	  and	  ex-­‐tent	  of	  any	  violation.	  	  	  	  
• Lack	  of	  forensic	  tools.	  	  The	  manual	  detection	  of	  an	  intrusion	  is	  compli-­‐cated	  in	  safety-­‐related	  systems	  because	  many	  of	  these	  applications	  rely	  on	  devices	  that	  are	  very	  different	  from	  the	  office-­‐based	  systems	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  most	  forensic	  analysis.	  	  	  While	  there	  are	  significant	  monitoring	  and	  analysis	  tools	  available	  for	  conventional	  IP	  networks	  and	  devices,	  very	  few	  are	  available	  for	  Supervisory	  Control	  And	  Data	  Acquisition	  (SCADA)	  environments	  that	  employ	  protocols	  such	  as	  
HART	  for	  communication	  between	  field	  devices,	  including	  Program-­‐mable	  Logic	  Controllers	  (PLCs)	  	  The	  factors	  that	  complicate	  the	  detection	  of	  malware	  using	  conventional	  network	  and	  systems	  analysis	  tools	  justify	  attempts	  to	  identify	  tech-­‐niques	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  support	  automated	  intrusion	  detection	  in	  safe-­‐ty-­‐critical	  systems.	  	  
3 Blacklist Approaches to Intrusion Detection NIST	  [9]	  advocate	  the	  use	  of	  several	  different	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  to	  automatically	  detect	  potential	   incidents.	   	   	  The	   intention	   is	   to	   increase	  cyber	  situation	  awareness.	   	  However,	   the	  use	  of	  diverse	  monitoring	  sys-­‐tems	  further	  complicates	  safety-­‐critical	  software	  engineering.	  	  In	  order	  to	  obtain	   regulatory	   approval,	   companies	  must	   demonstrate	   the	   reliability	  of	   their	   code	  within	   its	   intended	   context	   of	   use.	   Companies	  must	   show	  that	  intrusion	  detection	  and	  prevention	  systems,	  antivirus	  software,	  and	  file	  integrity	  systems	  do	  not	  undermine	  the	  safety	  of	  application	  process-­‐es.	  	  	  Blacklisting	  relies	  on	  detecting	  the	  characteristics	  of	  malware	  in	  contrast	  to	  whitelisting,	  discussed	  in	  subsequent	  sections,	  which	  compiles	  lists	  of	  approved	  code.	  All	  processes/requests	  are	  approved	  unless	  they	  are	  ex-­‐plicitly	  mentioned	   on	   the	   blacklist.	   In	   contrast,	   whitelist	   approaches	   to	  intrusion	  detection	  block	  everything	  by	  default	  unless	  they	  are	  explicitly	  approved.	   Greylist	   approaches	   enable	   the	   temporary	   suspension	   of	   ac-­‐cess	  rights.	  Blacklist	   techniques	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   a	   range	   of	   resources	   including	  email	   addresses	   –	   for	   example,	   to	  prevent	  phishing	   attacks.	   	   	   	   They	   can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  IP	  addresses	  and	  DNS	  to	  throttle	  back	  denial	  of	  service	  attacks.	  	  	  Most	  typically,	  however,	  blacklists	  are	  used	  to	  record	  character-­‐istics	  of	  malware	   including	   file	  names,	   types,	  sizes,	  content	  patterns	  etc.	  Control	  software	  is	  needed	  to	  implement	  the	  blacklist,	  blocking	  attempts	  to	  execute	  the	  files	  associated	  with	  known	  malware.	  	  	  
A	  number	  of	  further	  concerns	  limit	  the	  application	  of	  blacklist	  approach-­‐es	   in	   safety-­‐related	   systems.	   	   	   Most	   IDS	   systems	   and	   their	   associated	  malware	   signatures	   focus	   on	   office	   based	   systems.	   	   This	   is	   justified	   be-­‐cause	  most	  attacks	  are	  focussed	  on	  these	  more	  general	  protocols.	   	  How-­‐ever,	   existing	   IDS	   cannot	   typically	   protect	   industrial	   automation	   proto-­‐cols,	  such	  as	  HART.	  	  They	  will	  not	  detect	  attacks	  at	  this	  level.	  	  	  There	  have,	  however,	  been	   initial	  attempts	   to	  develop	   IDS	   for	  automation	  protocols,	  including	  Modbus,	  which	  have	  been	  embedded	  within	  commercial,	  open	  source	   tools	   [10].	   	   	  Without	   further	  work	   to	   improve	   incident	   reporting	  and	   exchange,	   significant	   doubts	   remain	   about	   whether	   the	   signatures	  that	   are	   embedded	   within	   these	   tools	   can	   accurately	   characterise	   the	  range	  of	  threats	  being	  deployed	  against	  safety-­‐critical	  applications	  [5].	  Many	   control	   systems	   are	   distributed	   across	   a	   wide	   geographical	   area.	  	  	  Many	   components	   in	   process	   environments	   are	   not	   networked.	   	   	   This	  limits	   opportunities	   to	  use	  blacklist	   approaches.	   	   	   There	   is	  no	   easy	  way	  for	  system	  administrators	  to	  automatically	  update	  nodes	  with	  anti-­‐virus	  definitions.	   	   	   This	   limitation	   can	   be	   addressed	   by	   manually	   uploading	  malware	   signatures	   –	   however,	   the	   more	   frequently	   these	   updates	   are	  applied	  then	  the	  greater	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  update	  process	  may	  itself	  lead	  to	  cross-­‐contamination.	  	  There	  are	  also	  significant	  resource	  implica-­‐tions	   from	   implementing	   this	  policy	  across	   complex,	  distributed	   control	  systems.	  	  	  In	  safety	  environments,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  concern	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  blacklist	  IDS	  does	  not	  result	  in	  critical	  software	  being	  erroneously	  blocked.	  	  	  Other	  concerns	  centre	  on	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  IDS	  itself.	  	  	  Uploading	  a	  corrupted	  blacklist	  could	  cause	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  detection	  system	  with	  knock-­‐on	  con-­‐sequences	   for	   safety-­‐related	   processes.	   	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   safety	  engineers	  would	  continually	  be	  engaged	  in	  a	  test	  and	  re-­‐test	  cycle	  to	  en-­‐sure	   that	  new	  versions	  of	  protection	  and	  detection	  systems	  could	  safely	  be	   integrated	   into	  critical	  operating	  environments.	   	   	  There	   is	  a	   trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  time	  required	  to	  verify	  that	  new	  malware	  signatures	  would	  not	   affect	   the	   reliability	   of	   an	   IDS	   and	   the	   imperative	   to	   quickly	   upload	  new	  definitions	  that	  might	  protect	  safety-­‐related	  applications	  from	  a	  new	  potential	  threat.	  
4 Whitelist Approaches to Intrusion Detection Whitelist	   approaches	   provide	   an	   alternative	   for	   intrusion	   detection	   in	  safety-­‐critical	  applications.	  	   	  These	  profile	  ‘normal	  behaviour’	  so	  that	  de-­‐viations	  can	  be	  reported.	   	  A	  deep	  knowledge	  of	  normal	  operation	  can	  be	  gained	  by	  reviewing	  logs	  and	  through	  the	  routine	  analysis	  of	  system	  be-­‐haviour.	   	  Whitelisting	   aims	   to	   ensure	   that	   only	   approved	  programs	   and	  software	   libraries	   can	   be	   executed.	   	   All	   others	   are	   denied	   system	   re-­‐sources.	   	   In	  order	  to	  be	  successful,	   this	  approach	  relies	  on	  the	   following	  measures:	  
─ identifying	  specific	  executables	  and	  software	  libraries	  which	  should	  be	  permitted	  to	  execute	  on	  a	  given	  system,	  his	  must	  not	  simply	  rely	  on	  file	  names	  or	  directory	  structures	  given	  that	  malware	  might	  then	  mas-­‐querade	  as	  a	  legitimate	  application;	  
─ preventing	  any	  other	  executables	  and	  software	  libraries	  from	  function-­‐ing	  on	  that	  system.	  	  This	  can	  be	  implemented	  by	  creating	  a	  hash	  digest	  of	  all	  software	  applications.	  If	  the	  hash	  of	  an	  executable	  does	  not	  match	  what	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  list,	  it	  will	  run	  and	  trigger	  a	  security	  event.	  
─ preventing	  unauthorised	  users	  from	  changing	  the	  lists	  indicating	  which	  files	  can	  be	  executed	  [11].	  Application	  whitelisting	  depends	  on	  software	  that	  maintains	  the	  lists	  of	  approved	  executable	  and	  library	  files.	  	  It	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  mainte-­‐nance	  of	  Access	  Control	  Lists	  that	  prevent	  unauthorised	  users	  from	  ma-­‐nipulating	  these	  lists.	  	  In	  a	  safety	  related	  environment,	  the	  software	  used	  to	  implement	  a	  whitelist	  approach	  must	  pass	  the	  relevant	  regulatory	  re-­‐quirements.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  approved	  lists	  may	  themselves	  be	  subject	  to	  safety	  assessments	  given	  the	  implications	  of	  denying	  resources	  to	  critical	  executable	  files.	  	  	  A	  host	  of	  commercial	  tools	  exist	  to	  support	  whitelisting	  –	  including	  Microsoft’s	  AppLocker,	  the	  Bit9	  Parity	  Suite,	  McAfee	  Applica-­‐tion	  Control	  etc.	  	  	  	  A	  small	  number	  of	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  extend	  this	  approach	  to	  safety-­‐critical	  infrastructures	  [12].	  	  The	  proponents	  of	  this	  technique	  ar-­‐gue	  that	  it	  has	  significant	  benefits	  over	  alternate	  approaches,	  including	  	  blacklisting.	  	  	  Whitelist	  approaches	  provide	  a	  degree	  of	  protection	  again	  zero-­‐day	  exploits	  –	  even	  if	  the	  signature	  of	  an	  attack	  is	  unknown,	  the	  ma-­‐
licious	  code	  will	  not	  be	  included	  on	  the	  approved	  hash	  list.	  	  Protection	  against	  zero-­‐day	  exploits	  is	  extremely	  important	  for	  SCADA	  systems.	  	  	  The	  Human	  Machine	  Interfaces	  (HMIs)	  that	  control	  local	  processes	  are,	  typically,	  connected	  to	  geographically	  remote	  data	  historians	  and	  servers.	  	  	  The	  relative	  stability	  of	  the	  software	  running	  on	  these	  systems	  provides	  considerable	  opportunities	  for	  the	  use	  of	  whitelist	  techniques.	  	  Locking	  down	  the	  data	  historian	  and	  HMI	  can	  block	  zero-­‐day	  exploits	  and	  notify	  the	  remote	  command	  and	  control	  center.	  Whitelist	  IDS	  have	  significant	  benefits	  over	  blacklist	  approaches	  for	  safe-­‐ty-­‐related	  systems	  when	  infrastructure	  components	  are	  isolated	  from	  standard	  network	  connections.	  	  Recall	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  resource	  implications	  when	  administrators	  have	  to	  manually	  update	  malware	  sig-­‐natures	  across	  complex,	  distributed	  control	  systems.	  	  Whitelisting	  avoids	  many	  of	  these	  over-­‐heads	  as	  the	  approved	  process	  list	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  stable	  than	  the	  blacklist	  malware	  signatures	  for	  these	  ‘air	  gapped’	  control	  systems.	  	  	  There	  are	  some	  complications	  –	  for	  instance,	  if	  the	  same	  attack	  is	  launched	  across	  multiple	  instances	  of	  a	  control	  system	  then	  it	  may	  simul-­‐taneously	  lead	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  distributed	  security	  events.	  	  	  System	  administrators	  must	  periodically	  inspect	  system	  logs	  to	  identify	  patterns	  of	  attack	  across	  remote	  systems	  isolated	  by	  these	  air	  gaps.	  	  System	  ad-­‐ministration	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  need	  to	  periodically	  update	  the	  hash	  tables	  that	  record	  the	  list	  of	  approved	  executable	  files,	  for	  example	  when	  an	  application	  needs	  to	  be	  patched.	  	  	  The	  whitelist	  software	  must	  be	  disabled	  without	  exposing	  the	  system	  to	  a	  synchronised	  attack.	  Recall	  that	  other	  application	  processes	  will	  still	  be	  running	  to	  support	  safety-­‐related	  functions	  during	  the	  update	  process.	  	  Recalculating	  the	  hash	  ta-­‐bles	  for	  approved	  software	  can	  take	  several	  hours	  for	  even	  relatively	  simple	  control	  applications.	  	  	  Hybrid	  approaches	  use	  blacklist	  software	  to	  scan	  for	  malware	  both	  before	  and	  after	  the	  whitelist	  update	  process.	  	  	  This	  still	  creates	  vulnerabilities	  –	  for	  instance,	  from	  zero	  day	  exploits	  that	  would	  not	  be	  identified	  during	  the	  scan.	  	  	  Further	  concerns	  arise	  when	  an	  attacker	  obtains	  physical	  access	  to	  a	  control	  system	  –	  potentially	  enabling	  them	  to	  reboot	  the	  workstation	  without	  accessing	  the	  whitelist	  software.	  
There	  are	  further	  organisational	  concerns	  in	  implementing	  whitelist	  ap-­‐proaches	  to	  intrusion	  detection	  across	  complex	  safety-­‐critical	  systems.	  	  	  It	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  coordinate	  the	  activities	  of	  many	  different	  sub-­‐contractors	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  do	  not	  trigger	  security	  events	  by	  installing	  unrecog-­‐nised	  executable	  files.	  	  	  This	  creates	  particular	  concerns	  when	  the	  time	  required	  to	  re-­‐computed	  the	  hash	  values	  might	  delay	  necessary	  safety	  updates.	  	  	  Further	  problems	  can	  arise	  in	  ensuring	  that	  engineering	  teams	  support	  the	  policy	  when	  they	  may	  have	  grown	  accustomed	  to	  making	  ad	  hoc	  updates	  to	  the	  systems	  they	  support.	  	  In	  consequence,	  whitelisting	  techniques	  may	  be	  restricted	  to	  a	  safety	  kernel	  within	  more	  complex	  ap-­‐plications.	  Here	   we	   have	   focussed	   on	   what	   is	   termed	   ‘application	   white	   listing’.	  	  However,	   there	   are	   alternative	   approaches	   that	   focus	   on	   the	   resource	  usage	   of	   application	  processes	   rather	   than	   executable	   file	   structures.	   In	  this	   approach,	   each	   recognised	   process	   on	   a	   whitelist	   is	   granted	   finite	  access	   to	  network,	  memory	  and	  processing	   resources.	   	   	   If	   the	   approved	  process	  exceeds	  these	  limits	  then	  a	  security	  event	  will	  be	  generated.	  Fur-­‐ther	  concerns	  restrict	  the	  application	  of	  this	  resource-­‐based	  whitelisting	  in	   safety-­‐critical	   systems.	   	  Many	   safety-­‐critical	   systems	  do	  not	   routinely	  have	  the	  level	  of	  monitoring	  implemented,	  for	  example	  by	  financial	  insti-­‐tutions.	   	  Networks	   that	  have	  experienced	   few	  operational	  problems	  will	  often	  not	  be	  analysed	  to	  any	  significant	  extent.	  	  There	  are	  numerous	  rea-­‐sons	  for	  this.	  	  The	  most	  obvious	  is	  that	  safety-­‐related	  engineering	  is	  guid-­‐ed	   by	   risk-­‐based	   techniques	   –	   resources	   are	   focussed	   on	   those	   applica-­‐tions	  that	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  safe	  and	  success-­‐ful	   operation.	   	   Attention	   tends	   to	   focus	   on	   those	   areas	   that	   cause	   the	  greatest	  problems	  for	  operations	  rather	  than	  on	  areas	  that	  might	  be	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  cyber-­‐attacks.	   	   	  Many	  companies	  also	  question	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  logs	  which	  are	  very	  unlikely	  to	  be	  used	  given	  the	  relatively	  low	  reported	  frequency	  of	  cyber	  incidents,	  mentioned	  above.	  	  	  There	  is	  also	  a	  justified	   concern	   that	   the	   introduction	   of	   additional	   audit	   mechanisms	  will	   increase	   complexity	   and	  might	   undermine	   the	   resilience	   of	   safety-­‐critical	  systems.	  
5 Information Diodes and the Threat from False Positives Naedele	  [5]	  argues	  that	  IDS	  can	  undermine	  cyber	  situation	  awareness	  by	  increasing	  “confusion	  and	  operator	  stress	  in	  critical	  situations,	  for	  exam-­‐ple	  if	  a	  malfunction	  in	  the	  plant	  causes	  a	  storm	  of	  alarm	  messages	  in	  the	  automation	   system	  which	   then	   again	   are	   interpreted	   as	   unusual	   by	   the	  IDS,	   causing	   additional	   alerts	   from	   the	   IDS”.	   	   This	   is	   particularly	   im-­‐portant	   for	   whitelist	   approaches	   –	   where	   any	   unusual	   activity	   may	   be	  interpreted	   as	   a	   potential	   threat	   leading	   to	   a	   cascade	   of	   false	   positives.	  	  	  This	   ‘alarm	   storm’	   is	   less	   of	   a	   concern	   for	   blacklist	   approaches;	   where	  degraded	  modes	  of	  behaviour	  are	  unlikely	   to	  match	  the	  signatures	  used	  to	   characterise	   existing	   forms	   of	  malware.	   	   	   As	  we	  have	   seen,	   however,	  blacklist	  approaches	  create	  significant	  concerns	  for	  validation	  and	  verifi-­‐cation.	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  convince	  safety	  regulators	  that	  updates	  to	  a	  signature-­‐based	  IDS	  will	  not	  introduce	  new	  failure	  modes	  or	  create	   vectors	   for	   the	   transmission	   of	  malware	   to	   isolated	   PLCs,	   smart	  controllers	  etc.	  Information	   diodes	   provide	   an	   alternate	   approach.	   	   	   ISA	   99	   and	   IEC	  62443	  advocate	  the	  use	  of	  these	  devices	  to	  implement	  zoning	  of	  through-­‐out	  Industrial	  Control	  Systems.	  One-­‐way-­‐diodes	  increase	  confidence	  that	  threats	  resident	  on	   the	  business	  systems	  cannot	  spread	   to	   the	  real	   time	  arena.	   	  However,	   information	  diodes	   can	   also	  be	  used	   to	   support	   intru-­‐sion	  detection.	   	   	  A	  one-­‐way	   flow	  of	  data	   from	   the	  operational	   system	   is	  monitored	   for	   signs	   of	   malware	   using	   either	   a	   white	   or	   black	   list	   ap-­‐proach.	  	  	  The	  isolation	  of	  the	  IDS	  from	  the	  control	  system	  helps	  to	  reduce	  concerns	  that	  the	  detection	  system	  will	  have	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  safety-­‐related	   processes	   and	   that	   the	   IDS	   updates	  may	   themselves	   provide	   an	  attack	  vector.	  The	  use	  of	  these	  architectures	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  panacea	  for	  the	  security	  of	  SCADA	  and	  safety-­‐related	  systems.	   	  Diodes	  cannot	  easily	  be	  deployed	  across	  the	  air	  gap	  architectures	  that	  have	  been	  described	  in	  previous	  sec-­‐tions.	   	   	  There	  are	  significant	  overheads	   in	  monitoring	  these	  applications	  and	   updating	   them	   for	   isolated	   PLCs	   and	   controllers	   distributed	   across	  production	  facilities.	  	  There	  are	  further	  concerns.	  	  Greater	  levels	  of	  moni-­‐toring	   may	   lead	   to	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	   false	   alarms,	   whereas	   in-­‐
creased	   tolerances	   increase	   the	  potential	   for	  missed	  positives.	   	   	   Further	  work	   is	  urgently	   required	   to	  determine	  whether	   advanced	  visualisation	  techniques	   can	   be	   combined	   with,	   for	   instance,	   machine	   learning	   algo-­‐rithms	   to	   ensure	   that	   IDS	   enhance	   rather	   than	   undermine	   the	   cyber-­‐situation	  awareness	  of	  operators	  in	  complex	  safety-­‐critical	  environments.	  A	  host	  of	  remaining	  concerns	  remain	  to	  be	  addressed	  at	  the	  interface	  be-­‐tween	  safety	  and	  security.	  	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  what	  measures	  should	  be	  taken	  one	  an	  intrusion	  has	  been	  detected.	  	  Existing	  guidance	  from	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  UK	  Association	  of	  Chief	  Police	  Officers	  suggests	  that	  computational	  infrastructures	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  crime	  scene	  [7].	  	  Equipment	  should	  be	  switched	  off	  and	  no	  redundant	  or	  secondary	  systems	  should	  be	  enabled	  in	  case	  they	  destroy	  forensic	  evidence	  or	  extend	  an	  infection.	  	  In	  many	  industries	  this	  creates	  significant	  concerns	  that	  safety	  will	  be	  undermined	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  an	  incident.	  	  Further	  questions	  relate	  to	  the	  forensic	  analysis	  of	  SCADA	  sys-­‐tems,	  where	  extensive	  logs	  are	  not	  usually	  retained	  for	  thousands	  of	  iso-­‐lated	  PLCs	  distributed	  across	  production	  facilities.	  	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  existing	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  provide	  greatest	  support	  for	  office	  systems,	  there	  is	  a	  critical	  need	  to	  develop	  appropriate	  forensic	  tools	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  at	  the	  lower	  levels	  of	  many	  safety-­‐critical	  infrastructures.	  
6 Conclusions  Intrusion	  detection	  systems	  help	  to	  detect	  malware	  in	  a	  range	  of	  software	  systems.	  White-­‐list	  approaches	  enumerate	  the	  processes	  that	  can	  legiti-­‐mately	  exploit	  system	  resources.	  	  Any	  other	  attempts	  to	  access	  those	  re-­‐sources	  are	  interpreted	  to	  indicate	  the	  presence	  of	  malware.	  	  This	  paper	  has	  argued	  that	  whitelist	  techniques	  cannot	  easily	  be	  used	  in	  safety-­‐related	  applications.	  Intellectual	  Property	  (IP)	  barriers	  associated	  with	  the	  extensive	  use	  of	  sub-­‐contracting	  make	  it	  different	  to	  enumerate	  the	  resource	  requirements	  for	  all	  valid	  processes.	  	  Further	  concerns	  stem	  from	  the	  widespread	  use	  of	  legacy	  systems,	  where	  users	  have	  limited	  access	  either	  to	  the	  source	  code	  or	  to	  the	  original	  developers	  who	  can	  characterise	  the	  legitimate	  behaviour	  of	  their	  systems	  under	  a	  range	  of	  operating	  conditions.	  	  We	  have	  also	  identified	  practical	  and	  technical	  concerns	  over	  vulnerabilities	  that	  arise	  during	  the	  re-­‐computation	  of	  
hash	  tables	  that	  implement	  whitelist	  techniques.	  	  	  We	  have	  also	  identified	  potential	  concerns	  over	  a	  loss	  of	  situation	  awareness	  when	  large	  num-­‐bers	  of	  unwarranted	  security	  alarms	  are	  triggered	  by	  degraded	  modes	  of	  operation.	  	  	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  blacklist	  intrusion	  detection	  systems	  characterize	  the	  behav-­‐iour	  of	  known	  malware.	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  effective,	  blacklist	  IDS	  must	  be	  updated	  at	  regular	  intervals.	  	  This	  raises	  enormous	  concerns	  in	  safety-­‐critical	  systems	  where	  extensive	  validation	  and	  verification	  requirements	  ensure	  that	  software	  updates	  must	  be	  rigorously	  tested.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  an	  IDS	  signature	  update	  might	  itself	  introduce	  bugs	  into	  a	  safety-­‐related	  system.	  	  	  Further	  concern	  stem	  from	  the	  diffi-­‐culty	  of	  updating	  malware	  signatures	  in	  distributed	  control	  systems	  where	  an	  airgaps	  are	  often	  used	  to	  isolate	  low-­‐level	  devices	  including	  PLCs.	  	  Information	  diodes	  can	  be	  used	  to	  isolation	  an	  IDS	  from	  safety	  related	  applications.	  	  This	  reduces	  the	  likelihood	  that	  signature	  updates	  will	  cause	  the	  failure	  of	  a	  blacklist	  IDS	  or	  will	  cross-­‐contaminate	  SCADA	  sys-­‐tems.	  	  	  Information	  diodes	  can	  also	  be	  used	  in	  whitelist	  approaches	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  computational	  overhead	  of	  checking	  process	  permissions	  does	  not	  rob	  critical	  applications	  of	  much	  needed	  processing	  resources.	  	  However,	  further	  problems	  arise	  when	  IDS	  false	  positives	  compromise	  the	  reliability	  of	  safety-­‐related	  applications.	  	  Greater	  levels	  of	  monitoring	  may	  lead	  to	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  false	  alarms,	  whereas	  increased	  tol-­‐erances	  increase	  the	  potential	  for	  missed	  positives.	  	  	  These	  concerns	  can	  be	  addressed	  through,	  for	  example,	  machine	  learning	  techniques	  that	  adjust	  the	  tolerances	  of	  IDS	  to	  anomalous	  behaviour.	  	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  such	  techniques	  can	  meet	  regulatory	  requirements	  across	  a	  range	  of	  safety-­‐related	  industries.	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